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According to Bill Lycan: 
Compatibilism, not just about free will but generally, on any topic, is the default. For 
any modal claim to the effect that some statement is a necessary truth, I would say 
that the burden of proof is on the claim’s proponent. A theorist who maintains of 
something that is not obviously impossible that nonetheless that thing is impossible 
owes us an argument. (2003, p. 109)  
Similar claims might be made about the presumption of innocence from penal law, the 
principle of indifference from probability theory (Keynes 1921, p. 42), atheism (Scriven 
1966, p. 88), the proposition that there is a material world (Berkeley 1971, pp. 241-242), 
or the claim that a building site is safe to visit. With respect to each, an uneven burden of 
proof distribution has been alleged. Moreover, contemporary argumentation theorists, 
legal theorists and others routinely posit uneven distributions to account for a wide range 
of phenomena. Nevertheless, Tim Dare and Justine Kingsbury have argued in a paper 
about unevenness “that legitimate differential allocation is much less common than is 
typically supposed. (2008, p. 516) Of course, what “an allocation of unevenness” would 
amount to depends on what a burden of proof is taken to be. We will defend a distinction 
between two sorts of burden, each with its own criteria for unevenness. We think that our 
distinction illuminates methodological discussions about unevenness and specific 
contentions (such as Lycan’s) about uneven distributions. It also also provides a 
framework within which the insights that Dare and Kingsbury offer can be reconciled with 
the standard view, which is that uneven allocations are ubiquitous. 
 To a first approximation, having a burden of proof is being under an obligation, 
generated by the norms of rationality, argumentation, or some institution, to support 
one’s view. Presumably, to have a heavier burden than another reasoner is to be either 
under a greater obligation, or obliged to do more supporting.  
 Douglas Walton writes: “Burden of proof is characteristically linked to the problem of 
an agent who must decide on a course of action or inaction in a rapidly changing, 
complex particular situation where certain knowledge, or even probable knowledge, 
cannot be acquired in time to make the best decision.” (Walton 1988, p. 242) Human 
decision-makers have limited time, energy, predictive ability and cognitive power, so their 
searches for information and their deliberations about what to think and do are limited in 
duration, complexity and informedness. They are fallible and susceptible to systematic 
errors and biases. “Very often, … an agent must act on the basis of plausible presumptions 
about what can reasonably be expected to happen in the given situation, based on usual 
expectations, customary routines, and common sense understanding of institutions, 
functions, and familiar sequences of actions.” (Walton 1988, p. 242) Allegedly, reliance 
on such factors can often be expected to result in an uneven burden of proof distribution 
– one in which burdens of unequal weight are associated with competing positions or with 
competing attitudes towards a proposition.
2
  
 But can such a thing happen? Here is a sceptical line of thought. The aims of 
deliberation are best served if each party assigns credence to a proposition in proportion 
to the total evidence available for it. If the evidence available to a particular deliberator 
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suggests, to some extent, that it is unclear whether the proposition is true or false, that 
deliberator should, to that extent, remain agnostic about its truth-value. If there is 
disagreement among deliberators about how to assign degrees of credence to a 
proposition, each party to the disagreement should have evidence for its view. So how 
could it be rational, as Lycan alleges, to require a more robust case from those who settle 
on one truth-value for a proposition than is required from those who settle on the other? 
 Here is a rejoinder. There are clearly some contexts in which the proponents of a view 
are not required to provide as compelling a case as those who reject it. To the extent that 
a view is widely-held, obviously true, or endorsed by the relevant authorities, we often do 
not require a proponent of that view to argue for it, though one who rejects it is surely 
required to argue against it, if we are to take such rejection seriously. If you remark that 
dinosaurs are extinct, I normally shouldn’t ask you to furnish me with evidence. If I reject 
what you assert, though, you are surely entitled to ask me why. Here we require a more 
robust case from those who settle on one truth-value for a proposition than is required 
from those who settle on the other.  
 There is, we maintain, no tension between the sceptic and the respondent. Each 
appeals to a different sort of requirement, corresponding to a different sort of burden. 
We shall say that having an attitudinal burden means being required to possess sufficient 
evidential support for one’s position. Lycan, interpreted as invoking an attitudinal burden, 
is claiming, very controversially, that if something is not obviously impossible, one should 
take it to be possible, unless one has decent evidence to the contrary; in particular, one 
can maintain this position without possessing any evidence for it and this is what it means 
for the burden of proof to be entirely on the incompatibilist.  
 Some writers’ characterisations of unevenly distributed burdens of proof certainly 
suggest something like the attitudinal conception. Richard Whately wrote: “According to 
the most correct use of the term, a “Presumption” in favour of any supposition, means, 
not … a preponderance of probability in its favour, but, such a pre-occupation of the 
ground, as implies that it must stand good till some sufficient reason is adduced against it; 
in short, that the Burden of proof lies on the side of him who would dispute it …” (p. 
112)
3
 Dare and Kingsbury (2008) almost certainly assume an attitudinal conception, citing 
Berkeley (1971, pp. 241-242), Reid (1863, pp. 230-234) and Scriven (1966, p. 88), 
amongst others, to justify their take on the burden of proof. Dare and Kingsbury are of 
special interest because their paper is about unevenness. They refine the sceptical line of 
thought mentioned earlier: they argue that legitimate uneven distributions of the burden 
of proof occur only under special conditions and that when a reasoning or argumentation 
is aimed solely at discovering the truth about some matter, we should expect an even 
distribution. It will soon become clear that if indeed they have attitudinal burdens in 
mind, we agree. However, most theorists hold that there is much more unevenness out 
there and we suspect that this is because they are working with a very different 
conception. 
 Accordingly, we shall say that having a dialectical burden means being required to 
provide sufficient evidential support for one’s position as part of a deliberative process. 
Lycan, interpreted now as invoking a dialectical burden, makes the following claim. Given 
the evidence currently available to participants in metaphysical debates about things that 
are not obviously impossible, they should (a) vote that such things are possible, if the 
election is held today and (b) not bother to garner more support for this position, until 
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somebody tells them something new about why it might be false. In short, given the 
current state of metaphysics, supporters of this position need not provide any more 
supporting arguments until their opponents do and this is what it means for the burden of 
proof to be on the incompatibilist. The claims made by Dare and Kingsbury about 
burden of proof distributions do not apply, given the dialectical conception. Unlike 
distributions of the attitudinal burden, uneven distributions of the dialectical burden 
regularly occur because they further the aims of deliberation, even in contexts where the 
quest for truth is the sole deliberative aim, rather than merely a means to some different 
deliberative end. 
 There are attitudinal burdens because people should think and do things for adequate 
reasons. An attitudinal burden is a requirement to possess sufficient evidential support for 
one’s thoughts and actions; its weight corresponds to the amount of evidential support 
required. There are dialectical burdens because people should reason and argue 
effectively and efficiently. A dialectical burden is a requirement to provide sufficient 
evidential support for a position; its weight corresponds to the work involved in providing 
the support.
4
 In what follows, we describe the criteria for unevenness associated with each 
burden. We suggest that the uncertainty, indeterminacy and controversy regarding 
conditions under which a burden of proof is uneven might diminish if something like our 
distinction is recognised. First, though, we elaborate the distinction itself in more detail. 
 
 
1 Possessing Reasons and Providing Reasons: Two Distinct Burdens 
Burdens of both sorts are attributable to propositions, or by extension, to agents who 
entertain them, relative to what we will call contexts of deliberation. We will understand 
deliberation as the process that occurs whenever mental activity, conscious or otherwise, 
is involved in decision-making, broadly construed. This includes deciding, or at least 
trying to decide, what to believe, how plausible a proposition is, whether to adopt a view, 
what to do and how prudent a course of action is. Deliberation about some decisions 
happens entirely inside an individual's mind, but some is conducted by groups.
5
 Some 
deliberation takes a while and involves the entertaining and weighing of opposing 
viewpoints. Verbal or other communicative behaviour may be involved in deliberation to 
express, clarify, precisify, or coordinate contributions. Indeed, deliberation is sometimes 
conducted via verbal exchanges: perhaps in soliloquy, in face-to-face discussions, or in a 
sequence of articles. Even when there is no linguistic or illocutionary element and only 
one deliberating agent, an extended deliberative process may have many of the features of 
a conversation, especially as conceived of by Grice.
6
 There are more and less orderly ways 
to deliberate, more and less effective ways to signpost the current state of deliberative 
play, more and less efficient ways to approach the deliberative goal and so on.
7
 
                                                 
4
 We chose “attitudinal” because, as will become clear, the relevant burden is to meet some standard of 
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 In some group deliberation, individual agents assume roles, such as that of an arbiter, or that of a 
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trade negotiations, are large or volatile. 
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 Grice would include the very formalised or ritualised interactions that constitute legal proceedings, public 
meetings and parliamentary debates among conversations. 
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Every episode of deliberation occurs in a context with its own unique features, because 
there are different agents who deliberate about different things, in different ways, on 
different occasions, under different constraints. Nevertheless, useful generalisations can 
often be made across contexts with significant common features: the type of decision 
being made, or the institutional setting within which the deliberation occurs may play an 
important role in structuring, informing, or constraining the deliberation in those contexts 
and may thus be worthy of theorists’ attention. Deliberation about whether to find the 
accused guilty, wherever and whenever it occurs, is characterised by many common 
features that distinguish it from deliberation about what colour to paint the drawers, or 
whether one ought to believe in God. Such differences show up in, among other things, 
the norms governing the distributions of the burdens we are discussing. Certain norms are 
peculiar to particular sorts of context, such as legal, or scientific contexts. Within these, 
we can sometimes distinguish norms for subtypes, such as public or private law. In 
addition, some of the features peculiar to individual contexts, such as the amount of time 
available for deliberation, or the precise cost of making a bad decision, may influence the 
way burdens are distributed among deliberators in those contexts. In describing our two 
types of burden, we will illustrate with general constraints that clearly affect distributions in 
a range of similar contexts, as well as with factors that operate in specific contexts. 
 Having an attitudinal burden, with respect to a certain proposition, means being 
required to possess an attitudinal warrant: that is, some evidential support for the 
proposition that meets a contextually determined standard.
8
 One is subject to such a 
requirement when one has, roughly speaking, some sort of positive attitude, or stance, 
towards the proposition: when, for instance, one gives it high credence, or entertains it as 
a hypothesis worth exploring, or decides to behave in a way that would be costly, if it were 
false, or beneficial, if it were true.
9
 The standard that evidential support is required to 
meet – and hence, how heavy that agent’s attitudinal burden is in the context – depends, 
to some extent, on which of these, or other, activities is being engaged in – that is, on the 
purpose served by deliberating about the proposition, in the context. It also depends on 
practical constraints on deliberation, agreements and conventions about what counts as 
relevant, undefeated evidence in the field to which the deliberation belongs and other 
contextual factors. Often, these factors will not fix a precise standard of proof and it will 
not always be possible to compare the weight of different burdens. Typically, however, 
deliberators who are curious about whether a proposition is true may reasonably hold 
themselves to a higher standard (and thus shoulder a heavier attitudinal burden) than a 
deliberator who merely wishes to decide whether the proposition is a hypothesis that is 
worth exploring further. Likewise, deliberators who contemplate an action that is 
extremely risky, if the proposition is false, should usually be held to a higher standard 
(shoulder a heavier burden) if they are gathering evidence for the truth of the proposition, 
than they would be if they were gathering evidence for its falsity. Certainly agents who 
                                                                                                                                               
do not use the word “deliberation” to delineate a type of communicative act or exchange. 
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 Negative and committed neutral attitudes or stances also attract attitudinal burdens. A negative attitude 
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positive attitude towards the proposition that it is not appropriate to have a view. 
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meet the standard of proof only if they have available a valid argument with self-evident 
premises shoulder a heavier attitudinal burden than one who is only required to be 
justified beyond reasonable doubt. Lighter still is the attitudinal burden to support a 
proposition on the balance of probabilities. A weightless burden (that is “no burden”) falls 
on one who is rationally permitted to have no evidence for a position. (The compatibilist 
enjoys this luxury, if Lycan is right and if he has attitudinal burdens in mind.) 
 The weight of an attitudinal burden carried by a supporter of some proposition may 
change during some process of fact-finding or deliberation. I may believe that my product 
is reliable on the grounds that it meets some industry standard. However, if subsequent 
research shows that a rival product meets a more stringent standard, it may become 
reasonable for me to adopt this as a new benchmark and apply the new standard when 
considering whether my product is indeed reliable. If so, I now shoulder a heavier 
attitudinal burden, with respect to the proposition that my product is reliable, because the 
evidential support I have for it must meet a higher standard before I can believe it.  
 However, an attitudinal burden cannot be discharged or shifted. I might meet the 
standard, because sufficient evidence for my view is available to me. The requirement that 
I meet the standard of proof persists even when I meet it: the fact that I have what is 
required does not stop it from being required. Whether I have it or not has to do with 
whether it is appropriate for me to regard a certain proposition in a particular way and not 
with what is appropriate for another agent, or how another proposition ought to be 
regarded. Plausibly, then, philosophers, legal theorists and others who hold that burdens 
of proof can be discharged or shifted ought not to be invoking the attitudinal conception.
10
  
 We can, of course, define a variant of the attitudinal conception according to which 
one has a burden with respect to a proposition if one has an attitudinal burden and is yet 
to meet the standard of proof. There is an uneven distribution of such a burden in any 
context where a proposition’s devotees have sufficient support for their view, while some 
of its detractors lack sufficient support for their view. This can happen, regardless of 
whether or not consideration of the proposition is primarily aimed at finding the truth. So 
unlike the attitudinal conception, this variant does not invite the scepticism that Dare and 
Kingsbury air about the prevalence of uneven burdens. Furthermore, if things change in 
our imagined scenario, so that the devotees’ grounds are undermined or a detractor’s are 
sufficiently boosted, for instance, we might be entitled to talk of shifting or discharging a 
burden. Hence, this variant may seem like a conception of the burden of proof with 
which many contemporary theorists operate. 
 We doubt that it is. There is a tendency in the literature to regard Whately as an 
important architect of the principles governing the burden of proof. Accordingly, we 
detect, especially in Walton’s (1988) work, a tacit acceptance of the possibility that in 
some contexts, deliberators who lack evidential support for their views nonetheless 
shoulder no burden. This offends against both the attitudinal conception and our new 
variant of it.
11
 Is there a usable conception of the burden of proof that allows for such 
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contexts, posits dischargeable, shiftable burdens and allows for uneven distributions, even 
when truth is a primary aim? We think there is and that it captures the role allotted to 
burdens of proof by many of today’s theorists. 
 Whereas having an attitudinal burden with respect to some proposition means being 
required to possess evidential support for it that meets some standard of proof, having a 
dialectical burden with respect to a proposition means being required to provide 
evidential support for it that meets some standard of proof, in order to contribute to an 
on-going, deliberative process. 
 To say of some stage in an extended deliberative process that I have a dialectical 
burden at that stage is, roughly, to say that an appropriate next move at that stage, or an 
appropriate long-term strategy to be at least partially implementing at that stage, would be 
for me to supply reasons for some view – reasons that meet a standard of proof 
appropriate to the aims of the deliberation.
12
 If I have an attitudinal warrant, I may supply 
such reasons by making it available to all deliberators.
13
 However, if I am required by 
another party to defend the proposition that I am in pain, and if my attitudinal warrant for 
it is strictly phenomenological, I cannot make it available. I might instead produce 
evidence that I have such a warrant, by writhing pathetically. Alternatively, I might provide 
evidential support that is independent of my own warrant, perhaps by reminding my 
challenger that a girder fell on me. 
 I can shoulder an attitudinal burden without a corresponding dialectical one. I might, 
for instance, be convinced that I am in pain (and hence, rationally required to have 
evidential support for my conviction), in a context where I am not required to deliberate 
about anything to which this conviction is relevant (and hence, not required to contribute 
evidential support for it to any deliberative process). I will not need to give voice to any 
evidence that I am in pain, or run through that evidence in my head at crucial moments. 
Conversely, I might have a dialectical burden without a corresponding attitudinal one. I 
might know that I am not in pain (and hence not be rationally required to have evidential 
support for the proposition that I am in pain), but be required to persuade some 
challenger that I am in pain – perhaps in order to show a third party how gullible the 
challenger is. 
 The weight of a dialectical burden is the degree to which one must exert oneself in 
order to meet one’s justificatory dialectical obligations. This could depend on several 
factors, including the following three: (i) how strict the standard of proof is (the sole 
determiner of weight on the attitudinal conception); (ii) how pressing the obligation to 
meet that standard is; and (iii) how easy it would be for a reasonably well-informed and 
well-endowed deliberator to meet the standard. Even if we restrict ourselves to contexts in 
which the balance of probabilities is the strictest standard one could reasonably require, 
these vary with respect to the second factor, the importance that attaches to the question 
of whether and how the matter is resolved. Arguably, more is at stake in a civil case 
involving a contractual dispute than when a teacher is deciding whether to give a student 
an extension. Meanwhile, if we restrict ourselves to criminal cases where the standard is 
proof beyond reasonable doubt, these vary with respect not only to the second but also to 
                                                                                                                                               
those contexts. 
12
 I may shoulder several dialectical burdens at once, because of the deliberative context in which I find 
myself. I may be required to provide sufficient evidential support for p, in order to provide sufficient 
evidential support for q, in order to provide sufficient evidential support for the proposition that my former 
self was wrong to deny that q. 
13
 The difference between merely having an attitudinal warrant and also being required to make it available 
is like the difference between being required to have a visa in a foreign country and being required to 
display it. I need a visa to be in the USA. I am not required to carry it with me when I walk on frozen Lake 
Carnegie, but I am sometimes required to display it at Newark airport. 
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the third factor: the obligation attached to the burden might be easier to meet in one case 
(because the prosecution has access to a smoking gun) than in another (where the 
prosecution alleges, for instance, that the defendant administered a toxin that takes twenty 
years to surface).
14
  
 A dialectical burden can be discharged, shifted or redistributed. If my drill sergeant 
insists that I am not in pain, there may be a burden on me to produce an argument for 
my contrary view. If I provide one, by reminding him about the girder, this information 
becomes available to him and I may have met my dialectical obligation, to some extent. If 
so, I have discharged, or at least, lightened, my burden. If he persists in his view, there 
may now be a burden on him to produce some evidence for it. If so, we can say that the 
dialectical burden has shifted to him or been redistributed.  
 Claims about who has a dialectical burden in much deliberation (outside of the court 
room, the public meeting and the like) and about how heavy it is are akin to the heuristics 
that govern how normal conversation runs, such as Gricean maxims and guidelines like: 
 If somebody asks you a question, answer that question immediately. 
 This principle recommends a standard response, but alternative continuations of the 
conversation are appropriate sometimes, despite the heuristic. I might say: “Let’s collect 
some more questions and then I’ll answer them all at once.” Or I might say: “Let me 
respond to your question with a question. That’s what Jesus would do.” Similarly, in many 
contexts, claims about dialectical burden assignments are heuristics that often, but not 
always, facilitate efficient, orderly deliberation and render that deliberation conducive to 
its aim.
15
 They are not hard-and-fast principles that are necessary for rational deliberation. 
They may be difficult or impossible to formulate precisely. (For example: it will often be 
inappropriate to specify, for a particular stage in a deliberative process, a precise standard 
of proof that particular agents must meet before discharging the dialectical obligations 
incumbent on them at that stage.) Of course, heuristics and principles other than those 
associated with dialectical burden assignments are also in play when we consider how to 
begin or continue deliberating rationally. These include directives that flow from the aims 
of deliberating in particular contexts. For instance, if your goal is to persuade somebody 
of the truth of a proposition, you should highlight information that lends plausibility to it. 
They also include more general guidelines such as: 
 Interpret contributions charitably; and 
 Do not commit yourself to controversial positions, if you can advance the 
deliberative process without making such commitments. 
 In many contexts, the significance of these other guidelines means that we deliberate 
without being guided by how dialectical burdens are distributed. In some deliberation, 
there is plausibly no dialectical burden, because the success of the deliberation does not 
depend on any accurate, objective, assessment of the extent to which there is evidential 
support for a proposition. These include contexts where the aim is to negotiate a 
settlement, or persuade one party of a view.
16
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 The conception of relative weight developed here is intended as a way to make sense of appeals to the 
burden of proof in argumentation theory; it is not a claim about legal theory. 
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 Because of these parallels between conversation and reasoning, we think that the dialectical conception 
of burden of proof distributions comports well with contemporary research programmes that focus on 
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references to burdens of proof, explicit or otherwise, in some presentations of pragma-dialectics (see, for 
instance, van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), argumentative discourse analysis (see Schiffrin 1985, p. 
40), communicative action theory (see Kopperschmidt 1987) and Walton’s pragmatic approach (see his 
1992, p. 383). This does not mean, of course, that all of these theorists would agree with all the remarks we 
make about how dialectical burdens are distributed in various kinds of deliberative context. 
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 We could, of course, adopt a broader definition, according to which there are different sorts of dialectical 
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 Claims about dialectical burden assignments are not always mere heuristics. Some 
institutions, including, famously, courts of law, impose strict criteria about standards of 
proof and how the dialectical burden is to be allocated, presumably on the assumption 
that such rules are conducive to the aim of the institution. This is not a problem for the 
view that dialectical burden allocations are often mere heuristics. In some environments, 
keeping to the left while driving is a good, defeasible, mere heuristic. In others, it makes 
sense to have a law enjoining motorists to keep to the left. We should expect the same 
flexibility in the degree to which dialectical burden allocations are institutionally 
entrenched. 
 Both conceptions of burden of proof assignments preserve the insight that you only get 
an uneven distribution when it promotes the aims of decision-making, but, as we will 
show, according to the attitudinal conception, this happens only in contexts where 
establishing the truth of a proposition is not a primary aim, and only in some of those. 
The dialectical conception is more permissive. 
 
 
2 The Attitudinal Burden: When Truth is Not a Primary Aim 
Considering the evidence for and against some proposition p is sometimes a means to 
some deliberative end other than truth. Consider, for instance, contexts in which I try to 
persuade you that p; contexts in which I try to win a dispute or a debate about whether p 
(without necessarily persuading other contestants);
17
 and contexts in which I try to decide 
among two or more courses of action and in which the question of which of them are 
worth pursuing depends on whether or not p is true. We will focus on the latter sort of 
context in order to show that in some, but not all contexts in which truth is not the 
primary aim, there are uneven distributions of the attitudinal burden. 
 Consider contexts where our view about the plausibility of some proposition helps us 
to decide whether to perform some action, where safety is crucial. My brother arrives to 
clean the gutters, but his ladder is not long enough.
18
 Should he instead climb my ladder, 
which is long enough? He only wants to do that if he can do it safely; there is a high cost 
otherwise. So he becomes interested in the truth-value of the proposition that my ladder 
is safe and he must evaluate it under uncertainty. If he is not supplied with good enough 
evidence to believe that my ladder is safe, he should not climb it.
19
  
                                                                                                                                               
burden associated with different deliberative aims. The sort that we are calling dialectical burdens might 
then be called dialectical burdens of evidential support and there would also be dialectical burdens of 
persuasion, dialectical burdens of negotiation and so on. Certainly, all such burdens exist. We have made a 
terminological choice in order to draw attention to the issues that seem to have caused puzzlement about 
unevenness. These have to do with the conditions under which one party is required to establish that a 
proposition is plausible, to some degree, whereas another party is not. If every deliberative aim directly 
generates a dialectical burden (and hence, something that might be called a burden of proof), there is no 
puzzle. Given the more inclusive definition, it is immediately obvious that there are uneven distributions of 
(broadly construed) dialectical burdens. There will be one, for instance, whenever I aim to persuade you of 
something and you do not aim to persuade me of anything, or to remain unpersuaded; in deliberative 
contexts of that sort, I have a (dialectical) burden (of persuasion) and you do not. 
17
 Since I can do either of these without any personal commitment to the truth of p, not all of these types of 
context are ones in which I shoulder an attitudinal burden. 
18
 We have adapted this case from Dare and Kingsbury 2008, pp. 508-509. 
19
 This does not, of course, mean that he should then regard my ladder as unsafe; he can rationally remain 
agnostic, or take some more nuanced intermediate position. In a variant of the case, an insurer, building 
contractor, or other institution stipulates that my brother may only climb my ladder if it passes a specific 
safety test. In this variant, the default is still that he does not climb the ladder, so there is still an uneven 
distribution. Notice though that if the test is not performed, or if my ladder fails the test, my brother could 
still, quite rationally, believe that my ladder is safe, even if he would have had even higher credence in this 
proposition had the ladder passed the test and even if he should not climb it. 
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 So, in this context of deliberation about the truth of a proposition, there is an uneven 
distribution of the attitudinal burden. Insofar as we are interested in how sensible it would 
be to climb my ladder, there is an attitudinal burden on anybody who takes it that my 
ladder is safe, but no burden on anybody who takes it that it is unsafe. We have explained 
this in terms of the end to which finding the truth of the proposition is a means. A lot of 
deliberation is like this and it is not all about safety (unless safety is construed very 
broadly). If you are not sure whether you want to access the in-flight entertainment, you 
should grab the headphones when they come past – just in case. If you are not sure 
whether you want to get married, you shouldn’t. If you are not sure whether the car is 
roadworthy, you should neither buy it (caveat emptor) nor drive it. Better safe than sorry. 
 There is likewise an uneven attitudinal burden distribution associated with verdicts in 
many court proceedings. For instance, in criminal trials in some jurisdictions, if the court 
decides that the accused has committed some offence, the accused may lose rights that 
the law normally protects. Criminal law requires justification for any interference with a 
person’s legal rights, so the jury must be sure, beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis of 
admissible evidence, that this imposition is justified. According to the institutional rules of 
these jurisdictions, if the jury is not convinced, beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis of 
admissible evidence, that the accused committed the offence, the accused is to be found 
not guilty, whether or not there is evidential support for the proposition that the accused 
did not commit the offence. So here again, we have an unevenly distributed attitudinal 
burden. And again, as with safety contexts, something is at stake that is more than, or 
different from, the mere truth of the proposition at issue.  
 We can explain the uneven distributions in the types of context described above in 
terms of differences in expected utility. Suppose you are deciding, under uncertainty, 
between two incompatible actions, A-ing and B-ing – such as climbing my ladder and not 
climbing it. (The point can be generalised to more than two alternatives.) Suppose that if 
it was rational to believe that p – that the ladder is safe, for instance – it would, for this 
reason, be rational to A, and that if it was rational to believe that not-p, it would, for that 
reason, be rational to B instead. Suppose too that we currently have no good reason for 
believing that p rather than that not-p, and no other way of deciding whether to A or to B. 
Then there is an expected utility imbalance with respect to p just if it would be more 
rational to perform one act, say, B-ing, than to perform the other, because (1) reaping the 
benefits that A-ing yields if p is true has less utility than avoiding the costs that A-ing 
bequeaths if p is false, and (2) the costs and benefits of B-ing are not so distributed. 
 Suppose my brother lacks a high degree of conviction in the proposition that my 
ladder is safe.
20
 Then, no matter how little or how much credence he assigns to its 
negation, he acts rationally by not climbing my ladder, because although he values 
cleaning the gutters, he values life more. Suppose there is insufficient admissible evidence 
that, beyond reasonable doubt, the accused committed the offence. Then the accused 
should be found not guilty, because although the law values the imposition of prescribed 
penalties on wrongdoers, it values the protection of legal rights more. 
 Identifying expected utility imbalance in these types of context seems to explain the 
uneven attitudinal burden assignments. We think we can generalise and say that in 
contexts of deliberation in which truth is not the primary aim, and in which there is an 
expected utility imbalance with respect to a proposition, the attitudinal burden with 
respect to that proposition is therefore unevenly distributed.  
 We think the converse holds too. Consider an episode of deliberation where truth is 
                                                 
20
 Decision-theoretically, the standard of proof, that is, the degree of conviction he would need in order to 
have a sufficiently “high conviction”, depends, in this context, on the expected utilities of climbing my 
ladder and of not climbing it.  
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not the primary aim and where the attitudinal burden with respect to some proposition is 
evenly distributed. I am running late for an appointment and unexpectedly reach a fork in 
the road. Should I go left, or right?
21
 I only want to go left if I will keep the appointment 
that way, because if I will not, the cost of going left is high. So I become interested in the 
truth-value of the proposition that the appointment is to the left and I must evaluate it 
under uncertainty. Ceteris paribus, to the extent that incoming evidence supports this 
proposition, I should be inclined to go left and if the incoming evidence undermines it to 
the same extent, I should, to that same extent, be inclined to go right. So, in particular, if 
the evidence in favour of the proposition must exceed some threshold before I should go 
left, then, the evidence against the proposition must exceed that same threshold before I 
should go right.
22
 Any attitudinal burden with respect to the proposition that the 
appointment is to the left is thus evenly distributed in this deliberative context. 
 Correspondingly, there is no expected utility imbalance with respect to this proposition 
in this context. Although I am deliberating under uncertainty, I am only interested in the 
truth-value of the proposition because of the way that my view about it will influence my 
decision to go left or right and these options do not differ in their expected utility. This is 
evidently why any threshold above which the evidence for going left should compel me to 
go left is also the threshold above which the evidence for not going left should compel me 
to go right. We think we can generalise and say that in contexts of deliberation where 
truth is not the primary aim, and where there is no expected utility imbalance with respect 
to a proposition, the attitudinal burden with respect to that proposition is therefore evenly 
distributed.  
 
 
3 The Attitudinal Burden: When Truth is a Primary Aim 
We turn to contexts where our search for the truth-value of some proposition is not a 
means to some other end, unless the end is satisfying curiosity (about the truth of this, or 
some other proposition), learning facts, shunning falsehoods, “an interest-free inquiry into 
the state of the world” (Hahn and Oaksford 2007, p. 48), or something similar. We will 
not be drawn on how much, if any, such deliberation there is.
23
 Attitudinal burdens are 
always evenly distributed with respect to the propositions at issue in such contexts and 
there is no expected utility imbalance. 
 If we are interested in ascertaining the truth-value of a proposition for the sake of truth 
alone, we should assign it a degree of credence that is proportional to the available 
evidence.
24
 If new evidence becomes available, we should update our assignment of 
credences accordingly. This will affect the probability that p and the probability that not-p 
in complementary ways: if it increases the degree of credence we assign to p, it decreases 
the degree of credence we assign to not-p by the same amount. So, the case for p and the 
case for not-p are systematically related in such a way that establishing one cannot require 
meeting a stricter standard than establishing the other. Any attitudinal burden is evenly 
distributed. 
                                                 
21
 Supplement the story in whatever way you prefer to rule out other options: going backwards, going 
nowhere and so on. 
22
 We do not assume that there is any such threshold (any standard of proof) in this kind of context. 
Plausibly, one should decide to go in the direction that is clearly supported by more evidence, however 
much evidence that is. Some writers, including Hahn and Oaksford (2008), would argue that this absence of 
a standard of proof means that there can be no burden. We will not address this issue. We restrict 
ourselves to considering when any burden that there might be is uneven. 
23
 It might help to think of particle physics or mathematics, in order to conceive of it. We will offer more 
mundane, though controversial, examples of it in Section 5 below. 
24
 Compare Hume in “Of Miracles” (1777), X.I.87; 1975, p. 110. 
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 Correspondingly, there is no expected utility imbalance. In a context where truth is the 
sole aim, we deliberate about the extent to which there are grounds for endorsing a 
proposition p, not about the extent to which there are grounds for pursuing some end to 
which gathering evidence about the truth-value of p is relevant. Questions about the utility 
of pursuing an end, as compared with the utility of the alternatives, do not arise. 
 Combining the results of this and the previous section, we can see that uneven 
distributions of the attitudinal burden occur only in contexts in which truth is not the 
primary aim, and not in all such contexts. Where they occur, they are explained by an 
expected utility imbalance. 
 
 
4 The Dialectical Burden: When Truth is Not a Primary Aim 
Having a dialectical burden with respect to a proposition is being required to produce, or 
display evidential support for that proposition; that is, to contribute it to a process of 
deliberation. The question of whether a dialectical burden attaches to a proposition arises 
fairly naturally when it is useful to model or reconstruct the deliberative context as a sort 
of dialogue or idealised conversation. We think that such modelling or reconstruction is 
often useful and that very often it reveals unevenly distributed dialectical burdens. In 
particular, limitations on our knowledge and our ability to acquire it mean that we 
deliberate under uncertainty and this often generates unevenness. In this section, we 
consider why it might be generated in many contexts where truth is not the primary aim. 
 For a start, expected utility imbalance yields uneven distributions of the dialectical 
burden just as it yields uneven distributions of the attitudinal burden. We established that 
my brother must have grounds for believing that my ladder is safe, if it is rational for him 
to climb it. This is why there is an uneven distribution of the attitudinal burden. However, 
if we are to make sense of the idea that he is deliberating about whether to climb my 
ladder, his grounds must function as his reasons for deciding that the ladder is safe. We 
can model this requirement by reconstructing his deliberation as a sequence of moves, 
where each move is a making of an inference, a choosing among alternatives, or some 
other piece of reasoning and where the resulting sequence is like a conversation that he 
has with himself, or with real or imagined co-deliberators. This may or may not reflect 
some of the psychological processes involved in his decision, but it certainly reflects the 
sequence of justifications, retractions, hypothesisings and so on that we evaluate in order 
to evaluate the reasoning. One move in the reconstruction might be an inference from 
some piece of purported evidence to the proposition that my ladder is safe. To the extent 
that the evidence really does support that proposition, the dialectical burden has been 
discharged; it has, to that extent, shifted to those who would question the proposition that 
my ladder is unsafe. No dialectical burden attaches to that proposition before the 
redistribution, however, for the same reason that no attitudinal burden at all attaches to it. 
Because there is an expected utility imbalance, my brother should not climb my ladder 
unless it is rational for him to believe that it is safe. So nobody is required to contribute to 
the deliberation by arguing that my ladder is unsafe. 
 These points transfer to the deliberations of individual jurors and of the jury as a whole 
in criminal trials. There too, an expected utility imbalance, associated here with the 
relative costs and benefits of withholding legal rights, generates an uneven distribution of 
both burdens. Meanwhile, there is a dialectical burden that is unevenly distributed 
between prosecution and defense. The prosecutor is required, by the institution, to try to 
provide evidential support for the proposition that the accused is guilty. If the prosecution 
establishes this proposition beyond reasonable doubt, the dialectical burden is 
12 
 
discharged.
25
 The defense need not provide evidential support for the proposition that the 
accused did not commit the crime. On one way of understanding how a verdict is 
reached, the role of the jury is to decide, on the basis of beliefs formed as a result of due 
deliberation, whether the prosecutor’s burden has been discharged.26 This gives rise to the 
unevenness in jurors’ attitudinal and dialectical burdens and we have seen how all of this 
unevenness can be motivated by expected utility imbalances. 
 In the types of context considered thus far, expected utility imbalance ultimately 
explains unevenness in both attitudinal and dialectical burdens. There are, however, 
contexts in which the attitudinal burden is evenly distributed, but the dialectical burden is 
unevenly distributed. This is because, although expected utility imbalance is the only 
explainer of unevenly distributed attitudinal burdens, there are other factors about our 
epistemic limitations that generate unevenly distributed dialectical burdens. Ascertaining 
the truth-value of a proposition, whether as a means to some other end or for its own 
sake, involves decisions about where to look for evidence and what useful conclusions to 
draw from it. These decisions are made under uncertainty by epistemically constrained 
agents: we cannot search everywhere for evidence and we cannot test every hypothesis 
that the evidence might support. We must select shortcuts intelligently. There are efficient 
and inefficient ways to search for truth (for instance, it is usually inefficient to cover old 
ground). 
 Because of these epistemic limitations and the compensatory strategies they inspire, 
there are many contexts of reasoning, solely truth-seeking and otherwise, in which 
proportioning our degrees of credence in a proposition to the available evidence gives rise 
to unevenly distributed dialectical burdens. This is because, in those contexts, attempts 
within the search to defend some proposition explicitly are more conducive to serving the 
aims of the deliberation (given the point reached in the search) than attempts to 
undermine it, or vice versa.  
 Consider again the unexpected fork in the road. We said that the attitudinal burden 
with respect to the proposition that the appointment is to the left is evenly distributed; I 
am trying to decide which way to go and I have no grounds for going left rather than right. 
At this stage, the dialectical burden is also evenly distributed, because I am required to 
provide evidential support for the proposition that the appointment is to the left as part of 
the deliberation to precisely the same extent that I am required to provide evidential 
support for its negation. However, suppose that I find some evidence that the 
appointment is to the left and that I am rightly moved by this evidence to assign high 
credence to that proposition. Were I to act now, I should go left. The attitudinal burden 
is still evenly distributed: there is no expected utility imbalance, so any evidence that 
should persuade me to go left, because the appointment is to the left, must meet the same 
standard as any evidence that should persuade me to go right, because the appointment is 
                                                 
25
 A prosecutor who is convinced, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty shoulders a 
corresponding attitudinal burden. In general, though, questions about related attitudinal burdens 
shouldered by prosecution and defense counsels have to do with their doxastic attitudes, not with their 
professional obligations. 
26
 However, the burden shouldered by a prosecutor is often called “the burden of persuasion”. So another 
way to think about the situation is to regard the prosecutor’s attempt to establish guilt, beyond reasonable 
doubt, as a means of persuading the jury, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty. Since 
persuasion is not a solely truth-seeking endeavour, this approach gives us the same picture as the one in the 
text, via a different route. On both accounts, the jury is required to deliberate appropriately about the 
verdict. According to yet another account, the prosecutor is not required to (try to) establish anything. The 
aim is simply to persuade the jury, perhaps by providing sufficient evidential support, perhaps not. On this 
account, the prosecution has no dialectical burden (in our sense) at all, but does shoulder a dialectical 
burden (of persuasion) in the broader sense described in footnote 21. Clearly such a burden is unevenly 
distributed, since nobody in this context is required to persuade the prosecution of anything. 
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to the right. I now possess good evidence that I should go left, but this does not stop me 
from requiring it. However, this new evidence redistributes the dialectical burden so that 
it falls more heavily on one who challenges the proposition that the appointment is to the 
left. There is now a presumption in favour of that proposition. This does not render it 
immune to challenge, but it means that any challenger should explain why we should 
reconsider the existing evidence. 
 Hence, there is a kind of deliberative inertia that is captured by the idea of a dialectical 
burden: the challenger must contribute countervailing evidence that not only redresses the 
balance, but also tips it in the other direction, before I should regard it as plausible that 
the appointment is to the right.
27
  
 
We have now considered two aspects of our epistemic limitations that give rise, in 
contexts where truth is not the primary aim, to unevenly distributed dialectical burdens: 
expected utility imbalance, which also yields uneven distribution of the attitudinal burden 
in these contexts, and the more general impact of our need for efficient truth-seeking 
strategies. The latter also affects solely truth-seeking contexts of deliberation. 
 
 
5 The Dialectical Burden: When Truth is a Primary Aim 
We will discuss three examples of kinds of contexts where there is plausibly a deliberative 
process aimed solely at the truth and where the demand for efficient search strategies 
yields unevenly distributed dialectical burdens.
28
  
 
5.1 Type I Contexts 
Consider solely truth-seeking contexts in which a highly plausible proposition is asserted. 
These include contexts in which the asserter is rightly regarded as an authority, unlikely to 
mislead: a stranger introduces himself by saying that his name is “Chris”. They also 
include contexts in which it is reasonable to judge that the fact-finding process culminating 
in the assertion is reliable (say, on the basis of past experience of similar processes): I look 
out the window and declare that it is raining. Also included are contexts where all 
reasonable steps to establish the falsity of some proposition – like the proposition that 
dinosaurs are extinct – have been taken and there is good reason to think that, if it were 
false, we would have realised that by now. 
 In such contexts, the dialectical burden typically falls more heavily on a party who 
                                                 
27
  What we have argued is that epistemic limitations can explain why the provision of sufficient evidential 
support for a proposition might redistribute the dialectical burden so that it attaches more heavily to the 
proposition’s negation than to the proposition itself. This argument seems not to generalise to all contexts 
where some evidential support is provided for a proposition. Suppose I provided supporting evidence for 
the proposition that the appointment is to the left that made this proposition just a little more credible, in 
the context, than its negation. Does this cause a slight redistribution of the dialectical burden? If so, we 
cannot explain it in terms of the way epistemic limitations call for efficient search strategies, as we did in the 
contexts where there was adequate evidential support for the proposition. If one view has a slight edge over 
a competitor, this is not in general a reason for thinking that we should be less sensitive to incoming 
evidence that offers further support for the view than to incoming evidence that challenges it. We should 
probably not respond to such a small difference in support by tweaking our evidence-gathering strategy. So 
can one explain how a small shift in support ratios could usefully be construed as a small dialectical burden 
redistribution? We suspect not. We suspect that no useful theoretical purpose is served by allowing that a 
dialectical burden gets redistributed, however subtly, with every change in support ratio. Talk of 
redistribution plausibly only makes sense when the change in ratio is due to evidential support that meets 
some standard that determines what we should believe or how we should act. 
28
  One might doubt that some or all of the deliberative contexts discussed below are solely truth-seeking. 
However, even if they are not, the uneven distributions in all of them can be traced to the quest for truth, 
even if that quest is best construed as a means to some other end. 
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challenges the proposition than on a supporter. Plausible propositions asserted by reliable 
testifiers, delivered by reliable research strategies, or supported by reasonable appeals to 
ignorance come with a sort of guarantee. It is more reasonable to assume, than to doubt, 
that if a stranger says his name is “Chris”, he is correct. In the contexts under discussion, 
it is unreasonable for deliberators to assume that the asserter lacks evidence for the 
asserted proposition. Challengers should not demand more evidence for the proposition 
without producing reasons.
29
 This explains why questions like: “Why should I believe that 
your name is “Chris”?” usually strike us as idle. 
 Michael Rescorla discusses scenarios that might seem to undermine our rulings on 
these kinds of context. According to him, these scenarios do not manifest the kind of 
burden distribution that we would allege. We consider two of them. 
 First, 
“[i]f I introduce myself to a stranger at a cocktail party, it would be ridiculous for him 
to retort ‘How do you know that your name is Michael? Justify your assertion.’ I 
would decline to answer. … I decline to engage my interlocutor’s challenge. I refuse 
to enter into reasoned discourse. My refusal does not violate the norms of reasoned 
discourse, any more than a refusal to play chess violates the rules of chess.” (2009, 
pp. 94-95) 
 For Rescorla (2009, p. 88 and p. 90), the principles governing burden of proof 
distributions are constitutive norms of reasoned discourse. Hence, the passage above 
commits him to denying that his reasonable refusal to meet his interlocutor’s challenge 
can be construed as a recognition that he has no burden of proof. Now we agree with him 
that this refusal can be described as a refusal to enter into reasoned discourse about the 
truth of the proposition that his name is “Michael”. We think, though, that this is 
consistent with taking it that he has no significant dialectical burden with respect to this 
proposition, and this might be an appropriate thing to say about some versions of the 
story. Maybe Rescorla asserts that proposition as part of a reasoned discourse about some 
other matter. Perhaps a visitor comes to the door and asks to speak to Michael. The host, 
who has not yet met Rescorla, announces this to his guests. Rescorla helpfully introduces 
himself to the host, saying: “My name is Michael”. Here, his assertion is part of an 
attempt to establish the identity of the wanted Michael. In this context, there is 
deliberation about the matter of who is being summoned by the visitor at the door. Given 
that context, it would be inefficient, if not gratuitous, to pause over the question of 
whether Rescorla’s name is “Michael”. So, in this deliberative context, the proposition 
that Rescorla’s (or the speaker’s) name is ‘Michael’ need not be defended. We can 
describe this situation either by saying that no significant dialectical burden attaches to that 
proposition, in this context, or by saying that Rescorla is not engaging in reasoned 
discourse about the truth of this proposition (because such discourse would not advance 
the current deliberative project). It seems to us that nothing turns on which description is 
offered. The former description usefully highlights the way that dialectical burden 
distribution is relative to deliberative context (since the same proposition in a different 
                                                 
29
 It is not hard to think of reasons. A detective, wishing to check details, might ask me exactly how I know 
it is raining. If my answer disappoints, there will be reason to doubt my reliability and this may undermine 
the support for the proposition I asserted and perhaps redistribute the dialectical burden. The claim in the 
text is consistent with the possibility that the asserter does lack evidence. The heavier dialectical burden may 
fall on the challenger, even when the proposition’s supporters lack sufficient grounds for upholding it. If I, 
though normally reliable, didn’t look very carefully before reporting to you that it is raining (and even if you 
suspect this), the dialectical burden is arguably still on you, rather than me, to show that it is not raining. So 
we are dealing here with contexts in which someone who lacks sufficient grounds for a proposition may 
nonetheless lack a significant dialectical burden. As we noted in Section 1, this is the kind of context that is 
disallowed by both the attitudinal conception and the “lack of evidence” variant of it that we briefly 
considered there. 
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context may attract a significant burden). The latter description highlights the fact that 
reasoned discourses are imbedded in broader conversational contexts.  
 Here is Rescorla’s second scenario: 
“In an ordinary conversational context, someone who challenges “I have a physical 
body” undertakes a conversational burden. But it is not a burden of proof. It is a 
burden of explanation. The challenger must elucidate his position, thereby helping 
the original speaker isolate the relevant mutually acceptable premises… Dialectical 
obligation does not shift from the speaker to the challenger. It expands to encompass 
both speaker and challenger. The challenger assumes an obligation to help the 
original speaker fulfill his obligation. The former obligation is parasitic upon the 
latter. Speaker and challenger must jointly pursue argumentative common ground, 
the speaker by isolating premises that support his position, the challenger by 
elucidating which premises he might accept or reject. The speaker’s obligation 
persists even if the challenger does not provide the requisite assistance.” (2009, pp. 
100-101) 
 We agree that any obligation that the speaker has persists under these circumstances. 
We insist, though, that if the conversational context is indeed ordinary, any such 
obligation, the speaker’s dialectical burden, is light. The ordinariness of the context 
suggests that challenging her commitment to the proposition that she has a physical body 
wastes time: unless and until her challenger goes some way towards discharging his 
burden of explanation, the speaker is under no pressing obligation to produce any 
evidential support. So, contra Rescorla, the heavier dialectical obligation, in the form of 
the dialectical burden, is on the challenger, if the conversation is ordinary. However, a 
conversation in which a participant is prepared to discuss whether she has a physical body 
is not ordinary: it is one in which she has a reason for finding this metaphysical claim 
relevant. In such a conversation, there may well be no dialectical shift and more of a 
commitment to a careful inquiry that develops from premises about which all parties 
agree. In such a context, the speaker’s dialectical burden might be substantial. In short, we 
think Rescorla’s observations apply most readily to extraordinary conversations. This 
reminds us that the heaviness of a dialectical burden associated with a particular 
proposition is context-dependent. 
 
5.2 Type II Contexts 
Some other solely truth-seeking contexts in which there is typically an uneven demand on 
participants to provide evidential support for their views are those in which a 
controversial, outrageous, or revolutionary proposition is asserted. (Maybe it goes against 
the standard view among experts; maybe it conflicts with something that most people 
believe; maybe it just seems antecedently improbable.) Examples include contexts in 
which some alleged scientific breakthrough, such as the achievement of cold fusion, is 
reported. Then there are controversial propositions that have been smuggled into a 
complex question, as in: “Do you think my successful cold fusion experiment will get 
publicity?” And there are contexts where somebody alleges a conspiracy, like: “The 
Crimean war was faked.” 
 Typically, in such contexts, the dialectical burden falls much more heavily on the 
asserter than on any gainsayer. In other words, a natural next move in the deliberative 
process is an attempt to defend the proposition and such a move is, prima facie, a better 
contribution to group deliberation than the attempt to undermine or rebut it. 
 There are good reasons for the uneven distributions here. In the interests of efficiency, 
we should not consider an outrageous, controversial, or improbable proposition, absent 
some story about why it merits attention. Inevitably, the fact that a proposition bears such 
marks functions as prima facie evidence against it. Hence, deliberators require a defense 
of any such proposition if it is to be treated seriously. So, for instance, the participant 
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responding to a complex question can demand evidence for the controversial imbedded 
proposition and has no reason for answering the question without it. 
 In some of these contexts, there are additional reasons for the uneven distribution. 
Some conspiracy theories are unfalsifiable; they cannot be rebutted conclusively. Those 
who allege that the Crimean war was faked can insist that all historical documentation was 
faked. On the other hand, there is no reason why they should not be required to justify 
their allegation. Requiring them to do so may advance the quest for truth, whereas seeking 
to falsify the theory almost certainly will not.
30  
 
5.3 Type III Contexts 
There are also unevenly distributed dialectical burdens in certain contexts where one 
participant in a truth-seeking endeavour has access to publicly inspectable evidence in 
support of the endorsed proposition, while participants endorsing plausible, competing 
views do not. It is often more efficient for the former participant to share evidence with 
the others than for any of the others to search for evidential support for their positions. 
This explains why it seems sensible to ask taxpayers to provide evidence for their views 
about the amount of taxable income they have, rather than to ask the taxing authority for 
a view about their taxable income, supported by equally compelling evidence. In many 
jurisdictions, the taxpayer has the opportunity to file a tax return and if this is not done, or 
not done to the satisfaction of the authority, the authority’s assessment is treated as 
accurate. (See Dare and Kingsbury 2008, p. 515.)
31
  
 
5.4 General Remarks about the Three Types 
We think that in the three types of context above, the contexts typically exhibit uneven 
distributions that result from the way epistemic limitations shape orderly deliberation 
about what is true. Individual contexts are nuanced: the various aims that a particular 
deliberative process has, how some of its aims serve others and what would count as 
realising each aim depend on history, specific epistemic constraints, subject-matter and 
many other contextual factors in very complicated ways. Hence, we must expect 
exceptions to our rough characterisations of types of context. We consider two. 
 First, here is a description, by Charles Rosen (1998, p. 50), of a specific deliberative 
context: 
“The great pianist Edward Steuermann once was approached after a concert by a 
man who told him that he had written an essay to demonstrate why one cannot play 
twelve-tone music from memory. “But I do play twelve-tone music from memory”, 
replied Steuermann. The man, dismayed, was silent for a moment, but he finally 
found a solution: “You’re lying”, he said.” (Quoted in Rescorla 2009, p. 108) 
 Despite any psychological pressure Steuermann might have been under to rebut this 
challenge, the context seems to correspond to be of Type I above: Steuermann is surely a 
recognised authority on his playing and need not defend his assertion. But, in fact, the 
                                                 
30
 We are not claiming, though, that in order to equalise the dialectical burden distribution, the asserters of 
an outrageous, controversial, or improbable, proposition must establish its truth to the satisfaction of 
rational disputants. They might need to do this if they want the proposition to be credible. But something 
less may suffice to make it the case that the potential denier has just as much of a burden as the asserter. 
(Compare Godden and Walton 2007, p. 315.) Perhaps the asserters only need to explain that they got their 
information from a government leak, or an expert. Then it seems as though we would have moved to a 
more even distribution. 
31
 This is another sort of context in which someone who lacks adequate evidential support for a proposition 
(perhaps the taxing authority) may nonetheless lack a significant dialectical burden. Tax collecting is 
plausibly not solely truth-seeking, so factors to do with the aim it serves may also shape dialectical burden 
considerations. Nevertheless, the factors mentioned here are relevant, whether or not the deliberation is 
solely truth-seeking. See Hahn and Oaksford (2007, p. 41) for a parallel discussion of product liability. 
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weight of his burden depends on, among other things, how pressing an obligation he is 
under and this in turn depends on the aim of any envisaged deliberation. If the aim is for 
several onlookers to converge on the truth about the possibility of playing twelve-tone 
music from memory, Steuermann’s authority can be appealed to; Steuermann and his 
audience can disregard the challenge. If, however, the aim is for Steuermann and his 
challenger to converge on the truth, some evidential support for this proposition from 
Steuermann is required. Indeed, whenever there is an acknowledged difference of 
opinion and a commitment by all parties to convergence on a common view after rational 
deliberation, advancing any position whatsoever on the disputed matter would seem to 
require accepting responsibility for defending that position if called upon to do so by 
another party.
32
 The weight of Steuermann’s burden also depends on how difficult it is to 
discharge. If there is a piano handy and a twelve-tone piece that is familiar to all parties 
and if Steuermann can play it from memory, he could easily defend his honesty; his 
burden is then relatively light.  
 For a second exception to our rough generalisations above about types of context, 
consider again contexts where outrageous rumours are propagated. We took these to be 
of Type II and said that a heavy dialectical burden falls on the propagator. But in some of 
these contexts, the most efficient, orderly, way for truth-seeking to proceed involves 
someone rebutting the rumour immediately, perhaps by discrediting its source. After all, 
it might be important to assess the rumours plausibility swiftly, because of errors and 
biases to which deliberators are prone: people are often quick to believe sensational 
stories, or at least, to want them investigated.  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
We distinguished two conceptions of burden of proof assignment. An attitudinal burden 
is shouldered by those who adopt some positive attitude or stance towards a proposition, 
just if they are required to have evidential support for it, in that context. There is an 
uneven distribution of the attitudinal burden only where there is an expected utility 
imbalance. This happens in some, but not all, contexts in which truth is not the primary 
aim, and in no solely truth-seeking contexts. A dialectical burden is shouldered by those 
who put forward a proposition for consideration in a deliberative context just if, in that 
context, some reasons in support of it should be rehearsed more or less explicitly, as part 
of the deliberative process. There is an uneven distribution whenever the epistemic 
limitations of deliberators can be usefully managed if more work is required to defend 
one of the available positions than is required for defending another. This can happen 
when there is an expected utility imbalance, but it occurs in other contexts of deliberation 
too. Unevenly distributed dialectical burdens occur both in contexts where truth is the 
sole aim and in contexts where it is not.  
 We suspect that views like those of Lycan on compatibilism, Keynes on the Principle 
of indifference and Scriven on atheism, as well as the methodological observations of 
many argumentation theorists about uneven distributions, are more charitably and 
fruitfully captured by the dialectical conception even though some written presetnations of 
their views allow for both interpretations Certainly the burdens typically discussed 
nowadays are dialectical. In particular, both the burden of persuasion (or risk of non-
persuasion) and the burden of production (or burden of going forward)
33
 are dialectical.
34
 
                                                 
32
 Pragma-dialectical analysis always assumes “that argumentation is part of a critical discussion aimed at 
resolving a difference of opinion.” (Houtlosser 1996, p. 30) So in pragma-dialectics, asserters are always 
regarded as shouldering a significant burden of proof. 
33
 A good source for understanding the adoption of these legal notions into the theory of argumentation as a 
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We discussed the former in section 4 when we discussed criminal trials; it is a 
requirement to provide sufficient evidential support for a proposition to make a case for 
that proposition. The latter summarises various requirements that arise at different stages 
in a reasoning process. At one stage, the norms governing what makes for a good process 
of the relevant kind might demand or permit a defence of a proposition; at another stage, 
those norms might demand or permit a rebuttal of that proposition. At each stage, there 
will be a requirement to provide evidence that meets some standard (perhaps different 
standards at different stages), in order for the reasoning to proceed satisfactorily.
35
 
Argumentation theorists have paid less attention to attitudinal burdens, which arise not 
from so dynamics of communication or deliberation, but from the requirements of 
rationality and the nature of our cognitive attitudes. They are relevant to argumentation, 
however, since when we argue, it is in order to settle the attitude that should be taken 
towards a proposition or course of action and an attitude is appropriate only if we possess 
evidential support that meets the corresponding standard. 
 Having said that, we have not presupposed or argued that either type of burden plays a 
key, or even an explanatory, role in argumentation theory.
36
 Our purpose has been to 
make sense of attributions of unevenness and debates about their intelligibility. In 
particular, our framework explains in detail how, even when truth is the sole aim, there 
can be one (attitudinal) sense in which evidence is required to meet a certain standard 
before a certain cognitive attitude is appropriate, but another (dialectical) sense in which 
evidence meeting that standard might not be required. 
 Because one can be required to have evidential support for a proposition that meets a 
standard of proof and hence shoulder a significant attitudinal burden, without being 
required to defend the proposition explicitly, that is, without having a significant dialectical 
burden, we do not need to perform the old, ground-breaking experiments and rehearse 
the old arguments every time we claim that some standard, cherished, well-established 
scientific belief is true. In the middle of deliberating about some detail of astronomy, we 
might have recourse to the proposition that the Earth is an oblate spheroid. The 
attitudinal burden is evenly distributed between supporters and detractors: parties on 
either side must have evidential support that meets the same standards of scientific 
acceptability in order to establish their position. We are, of course, rationally permitted to 
endorse this proposition because we have an attitudinal warrant for it in the form of 
Newtonian arguments that are unlikely to founder, but this does not induce a lighter 
attitudinal burden on oblate-spheroidists than on their detractors. However, the dialectical 
                                                                                                                                               
type of situated communication is Ehninger and Brockriede (1962). 
34
 Our treatment of these issues reminds us that it is wrongheaded to characterise the conditions that make 
for uneven burdens along lines suggested by “semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit.” Whatever 
principles operate in particular legal systems, neither of the burdens we identify is characterised in general 
by, for instance, the principle that “usually one who makes an assertion must assume the responsibility of 
defending it.” (Michalos 1969, p. 370) One who believes a proposition should do so for a reason, whether 
or not one asserts it, because one shoulders an attitudinal burden. Whether one must defend one’s beliefs 
is another matter. Meanwhile, one who asserts should perhaps defend, if one’s assertion is controversial, 
because one shoulders a dialectical burden. One need not, however, if one asserts the obvious. 
35
 The distinction between subjective and objective burdens in German law is similarly a distinction within 
the class of dialectical burdens. (Likewise, Rescher’s (1977, p. 27) distinction between the probative burden 
of initiation and the evidential burden and Walton’s (1988, pp. 246-7) related distinction between the 
external (global) and internal (local) burden.) We suspect that all the burdens discussed in legal theory are 
primarily dialectical. They apparently constrain the attitudes of deliberators (juries, for instance) only 
indirectly, if at all. In other words, they may give rise to, but are not themselves, attitudinal burdens. 
36
 It is open to us, for instance, to agree with Hahn and Oaksford that “the burden of proof is insufficient as 
an explanatory tool for the fallacy of the argument from ignorance” (2007, p. 58) and that there seems little 
point in attributing attitudinal burdens except where there is “a threshold degree of conviction above which 
an action should be adopted, given the particular utilities associated with this action.” (p. 57) 
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burden is distributed unevenly between supporters and detractors. Oblate-spheroidists are 
typically not required to demonstrate that they have a warrant. If they were, they would be 
required to provide at least some arguments in support of their position and subsequent 
deliberation would have to assign a degree of credence to oblate-spheroidism in 
proportion to the adequacy of precisely those arguments. 
 Distinctions among different sorts of burden have proliferated in the literature. We, of 
course, have contributed to this proliferation, so there is some sort of burden on us to 
justify our two-way distinction. We hope we have discharged it. 
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